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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
A title, like "On the Way to Truth", requires an explanation, in 
fact, a two-fold explanation. It requires such an explanation because 
it is both methodologically and thematically suggestive. These aspects 
of the title will be discussed in the next sections of this introduction. 
The first of these sections will deal with the methodological implica-
tions. The second section will contain an introductory discussion of 
the subject indicated by the title. 
METHOD OF PROCEDUP~ 
"On the Way to Truth" is more than a catchy title for a treatise 
on truth. It characterizes the type of investigation that is being 
presented. Unlike the title "Arrival at Truth", "On the Way to Truth" 
does not suggest the ending or final completion of an investigation. 
Unlike "Starting tovmrd Truth", it does not indicate the initial efforts 
in a new area. The concept of truth has been studied for a long time 
and will continue to be debated long after this volume is forgotten. 
The purpose of this paper is to pave some new ground for our collective 
journey towards a fuller understanding of what truth is. 
"On the Way to Truth" is also suggestive of Hartin Heidegger's 
words and method. It could be called an adaption of Heidegger's title 
1 Unterwegs zur Sprache. Even more important than this, is the 
1Peter Hertz in translating this work into English has given it 
the title On the Way to Language. 
1 
2 
methodological resemblance that it suggests. Both Heidegger's work and 
this paper are investigations which are "unterwegs", that is, "on the 
way", in process but not completed. Both projects are done with a view 
to further development. 
The announcement of some congruence between Heidegger's work 
and this paper should not be taken as implying that this volume is the 
furthering of the Heideggerian program, because it is not. It can not 
stand as the next step in the Heideggerian enterprise for four reasons. 
In the first place the methodological resemblance is not unique to the 
Heideggerian program. Secondly, Heidegger's work is not centered on the 
same topic that this paper is. Thirdly, the two investigations hold to 
different biases. Lastly, there exist methodological differences between 
Heidegger's project and this investigation. 
J. L. Mehta in The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger makes two 
points which support the above assertion that the concept of philosophy 
as "unterwegs" is not unique to Dr. Heidegger's work. In the preface 
of the above mentioned book, Dr. Mehta states that all philosophy is 
thought which can be characterized as "unterwegs": 
The finitude of human thought lies in the fact that it 
is prompted by a profound need to raise and answer questions 
about ultimate truth and is at the same time incapable of 
arriving at any definitive, eternally valid formulation. It 
is always unterwegs, under way, both in the thinking of 
individual philosophers and in the collective, historical 
thinking of an epoch and a people, though hardly ever aware 
of itself as being so and treading sometimes with the 
arrogant mien of being in possession of a total final 
VLSLon. It is ever on its way, groping and fumbling, towards 
a dimly perceived goal, not only in regard to the conditions 
of historical or biographical development but also in respect 
of the moves, techniques and methods ...• 2 
This statement is supportive of the assertion that a concept of philosophy 
2 J. L. Mehta, The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (New York: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), p. ix. 
as "unterwegs" is not unique to Heidegger's way of thought in two ways. 
First, it supports this assertion by being a statement about what Dr. 
Mehta personally believes philosophy to be. The statement occurs in the 
context of J. L. Hehta's presentation of his thesis: 
The following pages attempt to show how this conception 
of philosophy as a "way" and as being "on the way" is 
explicitly recognized and concretely exemplified in the 3 thinking of the great German philosopher Martin Heidegger. 
This thesis is very clearly established in the book. Secondly, it 
supports the assertion in question by implying that there have been 
other philosophers throughout the ages who have conceived of philosophy 
in the same way that Heidegger and he himself have. The second point 
that he makes which is supportive of the assertion under discussion 
is that there is not as wide a gulf between contemporary Anglo-American 
philosophizing and the thinking of Martin Heidegger as many have 
thought. 
It may, however, be pointed out that, despite differences 
in starting-point and contextual milieu, contemporary analyt-
ical philosophy is in pursuit of aims which are not themselves 
basically different from those of phenomenology. Both analyt-
ical philosophy and phenomenology subserve at bottom a common 
logos, discourse aimed at disclosure of what is hidden and 
implicit in experience, in the way we understand things, in 
language. What Moore and Price seek, what Wittgenstein and 
Wisdom, Ryle and Austin achieve, is illumination and dis-
closure of hidden structures, helping us, in F. Waismann's 
words, "to open our eyes, to bring us to see things in a new 
way." In his own way, and perhaps in a profounder sense, 
this is just what Heidegger does all the time, bringing some4 
"state of affairs" into view, letting what is come to light. 
Mehta's further elucidation here is supportive of the assertion that a 
concept of philosophy as "unterwegs" is not unique to Heidegger's way 
3 Mehta, p. ix. 
4 Mehta, pp. xiii-xiv. 
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of thinking in establishing a greater degree of commonality between 
contemporary Anglo-American and Heideggerian methodology. Considering 
the support that has been given, it seems clear that the concept of 
philosophy as "unterwegs" is not unique to Heideggerian thought. 
Heidegger, if he were still alive, would not accept this project 
as a furthering of his work, or even a truly philosophic endeavor, 
because it is not an investigation into being. The driving question of 
this paper is not about being but truth. Heidegger conceives of 
philosophy as the attempt to become clear about the nature of being 
by asking the question, "Why are there essents [things that are] rather 
than nothing?"5 According to Heidegger, philosophy is not interested 
in what populates the world, but why it does. Questions about what we 
encounter in the world, be they questions concerning animals or con-
4 
cepts, belong to the particular sciences. In Heidegger's eyes our 
investigation would be philological rather than philosophical. 
Heidegger would also not think very highly of the suggestion 
that this investigation is a piece of philosophizing in the Heideggerian 
style, because of his bias against the concept of Christian philosophy. 
In fact, Dr. Heidegger once wrote that Christian philosophy is a "round 
square and a misunderstanding."6 It is an impossibility, in Heidegger's 
eyes, not because Christians cannot think, but because they already 
have the answer to the question of philosophy. Concerning Christians, 
he alleges: 
Anyone for whom the Bible is divine revelation and truth 
5Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph 
Manheim (Anchor Books ed.; Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961), 
p. 1. 
6Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 6. 
has the answer to the question "Why are there essents rather 
than nothing?" even before it is asked: everything that is, 
except God himself, has7been created by Him. God himself, the increate creator, "is." 
Lastly, this investigation does not fit comfortably into the 
Heideggerian mold, because it differs in method. Even though the 
Heideggerian corpus and this paper exhibit an interest in the history 
of philosophy and in exegesis, their views in these areas differ con-
siderably. Heidegger is interested only in the Western philosophic 
tradition from the Presocratic philosophers through Nietzsche. 8 On the 
other hand, this paper will deal with three periods of history, only 
one of which is of interest to Heidegger. Like Heidegger, this author 
has an interest in Greek philosophy. Unlike Heidegger, he is vitally 
interested in contemporary philosophy and Biblical thought. Not only 
is there a difference in terms of historical interests, different 
views are held by the two authors with regard to the nature of exegesis. 
In the process of commenting on lines 332-75 of Sophocles' Antigone, 
Heidegger makes the following statement concerning exegesis: 
The actual interpretation must show what does not stand 
in the words and is nevertheless said. He must seek the 
essential where nothing more is to be found by the scien-
tific interpretation that brands as unscientific everything 
that transcends its limits.9 
For Heidegger, the last step in exegesis is the revealing of what was 
left unsaid, but intended, by the author. This is a sort of asking the 
question behind the question: It is a guessing at what is happening 
inside the head of the author. Because the analysis of supposed 
7Ibid. 
8 Mehta, p. 123. 
9Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 136. 
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intentions is so speculative, this paper will be limited, for the most 
part, to a more scientific style of exegesis. 
Having turned from the Heideggerian banner, one might well ask 
under whose banner has this assault upon the hinderland of truth been 
made. If not some Continental giant like Heidegger, then perhaps under 
the banner of some Anglo-Saxon philosopher? While moving within the 
spirit of Anglo-Saxon philosophy, this paper does not parade behind the 
banner of any one Anglo-Saxon philosopher. But how can this be'?' It 
is because the philosophic labels, the old banners of Anglo-Saxon phi-
losophy, have been swept away. 
Just prior to his death in October, 1976, Prof. Ryle very ably 
described how these old banners were swept away in an article entitled 
"Fifty Years of Philosophy and Philosophers." In this article he 
commented: 
We could not care or even remember on which philosophical 
ticket he or she or we ourselves had formerly voted or could 
be relied on to vote tomorrow. So we unconsciously gave up 
bothering ourselves with the sectarian and electoral desig-
nations. They stopped designating. 10 
Probably of as great an importance as these sociological imputs 
to the sweeping away of the old banners, was the realization by most 
6 
English speaking philosophers that Wittgenstein was correct when he wrote, 
Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. 
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. 
A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. 
Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', 
but rather in the clarification of propositions. 
Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and 
indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them 
sharp boundaries.ll 
10Gilbert Ryle, "Fifty Years of Philosophy and Philosophers," 
Philosophy, LI, No. 198 (1976), 385. 
11Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. 
Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 49. 
But what did this mean to philosophers? It meant that a philosophy was 
not a collection of doctrines, an intellectual position which stood in 
opposition to other such collections. Philosophy had become the collec-
tive enterprise of elucidating language. The question "Who do you 
support?" was dropped in favor of the question "What concepts interest 
you?" And with the change in questions, the old banners became remnants 
of a bygone age. 
In summation, the investigative method captured in the title 
"On the Way to Truth" can be characterized in the following five ways: 
1. It is philosophical in the Wittgensteinian sense of the 
word, because its goal is the clarification of a concept. 
2. It is historical in that it deals with our understanding of 
truth at various periods in the course of human history. 
3. It is scientifically exegetical, because it is concerned 
with the expressed meaning only, and not any of the supposedly intended 
meanings. 
4. It is comparative in that it strives to relate various 
systems in a synthetic way. 
5. It is projective in that it is an attempt to move into new 
territory in a way that is determined by the historical development of 
the concept under investigation. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
If we are to be truly philosophical in the Wittgensteinian 
sense, we should turn from the question "Who do we support?" to the 
question "What concepts interest us?" In turning to this question, we 
are again brought back to the title, "On the Way to Truth." The first 
7 
words of the title suggested the method. The last word determines the 
theme, the topic, of this investigation. This work is concerned with 
the notion of truth. 
Our notion of truth is indeed very rich and much too complex for 
one brief investigation. A full treatment of this concept would involve 
not only an inquiry into the meaning of truth, but would involve a 
cataloging of the items we commonly label as "true." Such a cataloging, 
even of just the truths of Christianity, would require thousands of 
volumes this size. Therefore, this volume will be limited to a dis-
cussion of the meaning of truth. 
Despite the fact that we are not interested in cataloging 
various truths, an understanding of the things that we call "true" will 
aid us in further limiting our investigation. Prof. Alan R. White in 
his book Truth states: "The things that we call "true" fall into two 
classes, namely, what is said and things other than what is said."12 
In the first class of things, i.e., the things that are said, we find 
statements, accounts, stories, etc. The second class of things is 
represented by objects, such as, paper and ink, and concepts, such as, 
goodness and beauty. Items in the first class are called "true" for a 
different reason, than the items of the second class. According to 
p 
When an X, e.g., a statement or a story, is charac-
terized as true in virtue of what is said in it rather than 
for itself, such an X is a true X if and only if what is 
said in it is true. 1.Jhen, on the other hand, an X, e.g., 
a Corgi or courage, is characterized as true other than 
because of what is said in it, an X is a true X if and only 
if according to some restrictive standards of X it is true 
to say that it is an x.l3 
12Alan R. White, Truth (Anchor Books ed.; Garden City: Doubleday 
& Company, Inc., 1970), p. 3. 
13Wh. 1te, p. 5. 
8 
The first use of the word "true" is its primary sense, because, 
. . . the whole point of characterizing some X other 
than what is said as true is to suggest that "X11 is here 
being used according to some restrictive standards by which 
not everything which is called by that word is, in the 
user's opinion, truly so called.l4 
Because this second sense of truth is not primary, it will be regarded 
as superfluous and omitted from our considerations. 
Having limited the discussion to the truth of what is said, 
it becomes incumbent upon us to distinguish what is said from several 
closely related things. Prof. White states, 
We can distinguish what is said, e.g., that there is 
life after death, from (1) what is used to say it, e.g., 
the English words uttered or written in order to convey 
it; from (2) what it is the content of, e.g., the assump-
tion, claim, conclusion, objection, warning, belief, hope, 
or fear that there is a life after death; ang from (3) 
the saying of it, e.g., by the local vicar. 1 
What Prof. White is saying is that we must separate what is said from 
the act complex involved with it. We must not confuse what is said 
with the act of saying it, with that act's artifact or with that act's 
purpose. 
This is the type of distinction that J. L. Austin was trying to 
create when he distinguished between performative and constative. 16 
Prof. Austin used these two words to classify types of statements. The 
term "statement", like the term "proposition", refers to what is said 
by a string of meaningful symbols which we call a sentence. What J. L. 
Austin saw as distinguishing a performative statement from a constative 
14Ibid. 
15Wh.t 1 e, p. 7. 
16J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, ed. J. 0. Urmson 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 1-11. 
9 
10 
statement was (1) whether or not it described or reported something; and 
(2) whether or not it was part of doing an action. If a statement did 
not describe or report, and was involved in the doing of an action, 
then it can be classed as a performative statement. If the opposite 
were the case, then the statement would be classed with the constatives. 
The importance of this distinction to what Prof. White has said 
is that it adds to our understanding of the distinction between what 
is said and the act complex involved in saying it. Prof. Austin has 
added to our understanding of the act complex by showing us that some 
statements are part of the act complex to which they are related and 
not part of what is said. For example, the statement, "I pronounce you 
man and wife," is not a description of a couple's relationship but a 
part of the act of uniting them in holy matrimony. This means that a 
performative differs from a constative in being the expression of an 
act and not the description of that act. 
Now the distinction between what is said and the act complex 
involved in saying it, is important to us because only what is said 
can be true in the primary sense of the term. The act of saying that 
there is life after death by the local vicar is properly speaking neither 
true nor false, but only appropriate or inappropriate. For example, it 
waul d he appropriate for the vi car to say it at a fune.r-i;:ja..~.1 ......... aw.n.ud.J.-,-.-, .... mLuO~s-~.t--------
likely, inappropriate at a christening. Similarly, the artifact of 
this expression, the ink marks on the page, can be judged as true in 
only the secondary sense of the term. In this sense, "true" becomes a 
synonym for "proper" or "well-formed." Lastly, even though this ex-
pression can be used to express a truth, it can be used to generate 
hope, as well. 
11 
In summation, four limitations have been placed upon this inves-
tigation. First, taking a lead from the title, the investigation has 
been limited to a discussion of the notion of truth. Realizing the 
immensity of the task, it was decided to investigate only the meaning 
of truth, and not to become involved in the cataloging of truths. In 
the third place, the study has been limited to the primary sense of 
the word "true", that is, as it is applied to what is said. Last, it 
was found that not everything that could be said was either true or 
false in the primary sense of the word, and decided to exclude the truth 
of performative utterances from our investigation. By means of these 
restrictions, this study has been limited to an investigation of the 
truth of what is said. 
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Having limited the investigation to the truth of what is said, 
what problems can be discussed? The crucial disagreements appear to 
deal with particular truths, and not the nature of truth. The populace 
is more interested in the truths of the environmental sciences or the 
Christian faith than the definition of truth. The man on the street, 
unlike Pilate, rarely asks, "What is truth?" 
Even more debatable than the hazards of smoking, is the nature 
of truth, especially the truth of what is said. The nature of truth is 
more hotly debated now than at any other time in history. Prior to 
the development of the Pragmatic Theory of truth, only three theories 
of truth had been considered in the Western world. They are the Platon-
istic Correspondence Theory, the Idealistic Coherence Theory and the 
Presocratic Existence Theory. After the Pragmatic Theory's development, 
debate intensified. Several new theories, such as, the Non-Descriptive 
Theory of truth, were formulated. 
Inquiry into the nature of truth increased because philosophers 
began to find the traditional analysis to be inadequate. While it was 
generally agreed that a statement was true because it corresponded to 
12 
a fact, there was no such consensus about the definition of correspon-
dence. This proved to be a real problem when correspondence was applied 
as the criteria for truth. Without a definition of correspondence, 
the determination of a statement's truth could not be handled mechani-
cally: a computer could not be programmed to determine a statement's 
truth. The determination of particular truths was realized to be very 
subjective. 
Having uncovered this flaw, contemporary, Western man has looked 
for more in truth than a mere correspondence between what is and what 
is said. Without complete success, they have tried to link with the 
belief that truth is the correspondence of statements with the world, 
an acceptability qualifier. An acceptability qualifier is a criteria 
for truth. It is most adequate when it is a mechanically decidable 
method for determining a statement's truth. 
It is this failure on the part of contemporary, Western man that 
has generated this paper. This investigations goal is two fold. First, 
it must establish that contemporary, Western man has looked and failed. 
It must be established that contemporary, Western man sees more in 
truth than a mere correspondence between what is and what is said and 
that he is trying, though without complete success, to link with the 
belief that truth is the correspondence of statements with the world, an 
acceptability qualifier. Having established this first point, a new 
direction will be suggested that will point toward a more mechanical 
understanding of the acceptability qualifier. 
JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 
13 
This study finds its justification in two sources. The first 
source is the perennial confusion over the nature of truth. This con-
fusion is seen in the fact that truth is seen as being everything from 
the correspondence of statements to the world, to a logical superfluity. 
A second source of justification is the writer's commitment to the 
Wittgensteinian concept of philosophy as the elucidation of language. 
The writer believes that he has a responsibility to clarify concepts 
that are confused. Therefore, seeing the confusion in the notion of 
truth, the author feels obligated to clarify the concept of truth. 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Before the investigation can proceed any further, there are 
some terms which must be defined. These terms are: statement, corre-
spondence, and acceptability qualifier. 
Statement 
A statement is what is said. It is to be distinguished from 
the saying of it, the artifacts of the act of saying it and the purpose 
for which it is said. It is to be considered synonymous with the word 
"proposition." It can be said to refer to the content of a declarative 
sentence. 
Correspondence 
Correspondence is a relationship which can obtain between mem-
bers of different set, i.e., collections of things, and between sets 
themselves. It is a relationship which is best understood on the model 
of a matching process. Two sets are said to correspond when their 
members can be matched. For example, there is a correspondence between 
the numbers from 1 to 10 and the letters in the word "correspond." It 
14 
is possible for a correspondence to exist between unequal, but symmetric, 
groups. An example of this type of correspondence is the relationship 
between the numbers from 1 to 10 and the numbers from 1 to 100. For the 
sake of our investigation, the term "correspondence" will refer solely 
to relationships of the first type, i.e., a one to one correspondence. 
Acceptability Qualifier 
This is a term coined by the author to refer to the criteria for 
truth. An acceptability qualifier is most adequate when it is a mechani-
cally decidable, or computable, method for determining truth. 
This term is substituted for criteria in order to stress the 
fact that it is this test that makes a given truth acceptable. 
STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this investigation's presentation is to be 
found in the next four chapters of this volume. In the first of these 
chapters, the point is made that contemporary, Western man sees more in 
truth than mere correspondence, and that he is trying to link corre-
spondence with an acceptability qualifier. In chapter 3, a new direction 
is established through a discussion of Heidegger's attack on analytical 
philosophizing concerning truth, the positive statement of his own 
theory, a statement of his theory's effect on the acceptability qualifier, 
and an analysis of his sources. Within the pages of chapter 4 is 
revealed a Biblical Theory of truth and its answer to the question: 
"What is the standard for material truth?" The last chapter contains 
the final statement of this paper's provisional theory of truth and its 
evaluation. 
15 
Chapter 2 
CONTEMPORARY, WESTERN THEORIZING 
ABOUT TRUTH 
In this chapter, it will become evident (1) that contemporary, 
Western man sees more in truth than a mere correspondence between what 
is and what is said; and (2) that he is trying, without complete success, 
to link with the belief that truth is the correspondence of statements 
with the world, an acceptability qualifier. The establishment of these 
points will be accomplished on the basis of the critical analysis of 
three contemporary, Western theories of truth. These theories are the 
Coherence Theory, the Pragmatic Theory and the Non-Descriptive Theory. 
In each case, the relationship of each theory to the Correspondence 
Theory will be discussed, as well as each theory's development of the 
acceptability qualifier. 
The thesis concerning Western man's dissatisfaction with the 
belief that truth is merely a correspondence between what is and what 
is said has been framed in the contemporary period, because of the greater 
availability and variety of literature for this period. This thesis 
could have been cast in terms of early Greek philosophy, but was not 
because of the lack of primary sources from this period. That there was 
dissatisfaction with the Correspondence Theory in this earlier period 
is evident in the conflict between the Existence Theory of truth and the 
Correspondence Theory in Plato's Sophist. It is, also, seen in the 
16 
17 
fact that Aristotle saw the concept of future truth as being problematic. 1 
Before the relationship of the Coherence Theory, the Pragmatic 
Theory, and the Non-Descriptive Theory to the Correspondence Theory can 
be intelligently discussed, the Correspondence Theory must be understood. 
Therefore, the discussion of the former theories will be preceded by an 
analysis of the Correspondence Theory. 
THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH 
Of even more help in the explanation of the Correspondence 
Theory than a "slogan-like" characterization is the clarification of the 
theory's central issues, or problems. The slogan, "Truth is the corre-
spondence of what is to what is said," says much about the Correspon-
dence Theory, but not enough. For example, it does not explain the 
nature of this relationship called correspondence. Not only does it 
not explain the nature of correspondence, it fails to define the items 
related by the relationship of correspondence. It does not define what 
is meant by "what is" and "what is said". 
The expression "what is" cannot refer to a single object, if 
the secondary sense of truth is to be avoided. If "what is" were a 
single object, then to say that its name, i.e., the statement pertaining 
to the object, is true is to only say that the correct name has been 
given to the object. To say that a fact is a single object is to imply 
that statements, like, "The cat is on the mat" or "Grass is green", are 
names, like "Jonathan" or "Paul". It also implies that a true state-
ment is no more than the proper name for the object to which it refers. 
1Aristotle, De Interpretatione IX. 
18 
To imply this is to rob truth of its primary meaning. Therefore, the 
expression "what is" must be taken as referring to more than one object, 
for example, to a complex of objects. 
"What is said" is simply what is said. The words "statement" 
and "proposition" can be substituted for it. It can be said to refer to 
the content of a declarative sentence. "What is said" must be distin-
guished from the saying of it, the artifacts of that act and the purpose 
for which it is said. 2 
These two definitions are now at a fairly high level of refine-
ment and, for the moment, are not in need of any further clarification. 
This is not the case with the notion of correspondence. As a result, 
Lord Bertrand Russell's suggestion concerning the nature of this corre-
spondence will be examined. 
Russell on Truth and Correspondence 
Bertrand Russell is one of the many subscribers to the Correspon-
dence Theory who is interested in explaining the nature of this type of 
correspondence and in defining the objects of that relationship. Lord 
Russell first showed signs of an interest in the Correspondence Theory 
in 1906. 3 At this time, he delivered some lectures on the subject of 
truth that were later published in Philosophical Essays. In 1912, he 
refined his earlier thoughts and published them in The Problems of 
Philosophy. 
In The Problems of Philosophy, Mr. Russell states that, 
2 See page 9 of this paper. 
3A. N. Prior, "Correspondence Theory of Truth," The Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (1965), II, 226d-227a. 
... correspondence with fact ... [is what constitutes] 
the nature of truth. It remains to define precisely what 
we mean by 'fact', and what is the nature of the correspon-
dence which must subsist between belief and fact, in order 
that belief may be true.4 
For Lord Russell, truth is a property of beliefs. A belief is 
true if, and only if, it corresponds to some fact. Unfortunately, his 
use of the word "belief" is rather slippery. At one moment it may 
mean what is said. Or, at another, it may take on more of a sense of 
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the statement's purpose. Despite this slipperiness, much can be learned 
from Lord Russell's theory; because his analysis is directed more at 
statements than their purpose or function. 
A true belief, according to Lord Russell, is not a relationship 
between the belief and a single object (e.g., Desdemona's love for 
Cassia), but a belief and a complex of objects (e.g., Desdemona, loving 
and Cassio). 5 He feels forced to make this point in order to insure 
that there can be falsehoods. If the relationship was between a belief 
and a single object, e.g., Desdemona's love for Cassia, and that 
object did not exist, then the statement, "Othello believes that 
Desdemona loves Cassia," would be nonsense. It would be nonsense, 
because it would refer to nothing. Following Russell's suggestion, 
even if the statement was false, it would not be nonsense. It would not 
be nonsense, because it would still refer to various objects, i.e., 
Desdemona, loving and Cassia. 
Having now defined Russell's use of the terms "belief" and "fact", 
the nature of the correspondence that can hold between true beliefs 
and facts can be discussed. A belief, a statement, is true, when there 
4 Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1959), p. 123. 
5 Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, pp. 124-130. 
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exists a semi-parallelism between the last words of the statement and 
6 the fact. For example, the statement, "Othello believes that Desdemona 
loves Cassio," is true if, and only if, in fact, Desdemona loves Cassio. 
If Desdemona loves Cassio, then the same order is shared by the last 
words of Othello's belief, i.e., the words "Desdemona", "loves" and 
"Cassio", and the fact. It is this paralleling of the respective orders 
that Russell considers to be the nature of the correspondence between 
true beliefs and facts. 
It should be noted that Russell's theory does not completely 
agree with the Correspondence Theory as presented in this paper. While 
sharing the same view about the nature of what is, that is, that facts 
are complexes of objects, the two theories differ with respect to the 
definition of the first term of the relationship. Mr. Russell's defi-
nition is more inclusive. It allows for both what is said and its 
function. 
Lord Russell's analysis of the correspondence relationship is 
delightful and can serve as the explanation of correspondence that this 
paper has been lacking. It can be objected that the adoption of Mr. 
Russell's analysis of the correspondence relationship is not proper, 
because of the difference in the two theories' view of what can serve 
as the first member of the relationship. Since Russell's view is more 
inclusive, there is no problem. What is true of a group in general is 
always true of each of its members. Therefore, it is not improper to 
adopt Russell's analysis. Since it is not improper to adopt this 
analysis, it will be from this point on considered part of the Corre-
spondence Theory presented in this paper. 
6p . rlor, 226d-227a. 
Alfred Tarski and Precision 
Someone may object that the Correspondence Theory presented in 
this paper lacks precision. In fact, such an objection has been made 
by the great Polish logician Alfred Tarski. The current theory lacks 
precision, because it employs two ambiguous terms, i.e., "proposition" 
7 
and "true." For Prof. Tarski, the term "proposition" lacks precision, 
because 
. . . its meaning is notoriously a subject of lengthy 
disputations by various philosophers and logicians, and it8 
seems never to have been made quite clear and unambiguous. 
Similarly, Prof. Tarski considers the word "true" to be ambiguous. He 
expresses this point in these words: 
The >vord "true," like other words from our everyday 
language, is certainly not unambiguous. And it does not 
seem to me that the philosophers who have discussed this 
concept have helped to diminish its ambiguity. In works 
and discussions of philosophers we meet many different con-
ceptions of truth and falsity, and we must indicate which 
conception will be the basis of our discussion.9 
These points, especially the first, suggest that the Correspondence 
Theory formulated in this paper is imprecise. 
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If this is the case, why not abandon the present theory in favor 
of the correspondence theory put forward by Alfred Tarski? His theory, 
which is too technical to be presented here, has a great flaw. The 
present formulation is limited to formalized languages, like those of 
mathematics and symbolic logic. Because of this fact, a transition to 
Prof. Tarski's theory will not be made. 
7Alfred Tarski, "The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foun-
dations of Semantics," Readings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Herbert 
Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 
1949), pp. 53-54. 
8Tarski, p. 53. 
THE COHERENCE THEORY OF TRUTH 
Even though the Coherence Theory is supported by a number of 
Logical Positivists, namely, Carl Hempel and Otto Neurath, it is pri-
marily a doctrine of the Idealists. 9a Therefore, this section will be 
centered on the Coherence Theory as formulated by the Idealists. 
Undoubtedly, Idealism's best exposition is to be found in A. C. Ewing's 
Idealism: A Critical Survey. Therefore, the following presentation of 
the Coherence Theory will be largely based on his book. 
A. C. Ewing on Coherence 
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In Idealism: A Critical Survey, A. C. Ewing states that, for the 
Idealists, 
'Coherence' is held to constitute 
(a) a definition of truth, or at least an account 
of its nature; 
(b) an account of the nature of reality; 
(c) a criterion of truth.10 
It is in his chapter entitled "The Coherence Theory" that he tries to 
show how this is accomplished by the Idealists. 
The first reason why coherence can be employed in the definition 
of truth is that what we know is identical with what is. Mr. Ewing put 
it this way: 
Now j f truth means what is known or what facts are...-.f.o; . ~;-_________ _ 
cognition in so far as cognition is successful and reality 
means the facts per se, the view that truth and reality 
are identical may well be accepted. In so far as we know, 
9
aAlan R. White, Truth (Anchor Books ed.; Garden City: Doubleday 
& Company, Inc., 1970), pp. 109-110. 
10A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (London: Methuen & Co. 
Ltd., 1934), p. 195. 
what we know is identical with reality or it would not be 
knowledge. 11 
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In order for it to be known or considered to be true that there is a cat 
on the mat, there must indeed be a cat on the mat. 
If it were not for another belief of the Idealists, this belief 
would be more support for the Correspondence Theory, than it is for the 
Coherence Theory. Both theories declare that what is, is what is true. 
According to both the Coherence Theory and the Correspondence Theory, 
if the world were other than what it is declared to be, then those 
declarations would be false. If there is no cat to be seen on the mat, 
then the declaration, "There is a cat on the mat," would be false. 
What allows the Idealists to tie this concept of truth and 
12 
coherence together is the belief that reality is one coherent system. 
But what is it to say that reality is one coherent system? 
Coherence must not be confused with self-consistency. 
Anybody ~vho believed in a thoroughly pluralistic world 
in which every fact was logically independent of every 
other would still hold that his view was self-consistent 
in that the different facts did not contradict each 
other, but he certainly would not be maintaining the 
coherence theory but rather its opposite. What is meant 
is not merely that the different facts do not contradict 
each other, which would be compatible with their being 
all quite indifferent to each other logically, but that 
they stand in some lositive logical relation of entail-
ment to each other. 3 
The world is coherent, because the facts of the world are both consis-
tent with and dependent upon each other. Because this is the case, 
coherence can be used as a criterion for sorting true statements from 
llE . 199 Wlng, p. . 
12E . 228 w1ng, p. . 
13Ewing, pp. 228-229. 
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false statements. Because it would be the case that a coherent set of 
statements would represent, and would be parallel to, a set of facts. 
This would not be the case with false, that is, incoherent statements; 
because there would be no parallel or matching set of facts. 
Having completed a discussion of the three things coherence is 
said to constitute, it becomes necessary to mention a peculiar aspect 
of the Coherence Theory. This peculiar aspect is the doctrine that 
14 
statements are both partly true and partly false. This seems to 
conflict with the whole notion of the Coherence Theory, but really does 
not. It does not conflict, because statements are thought of as com-
plex ideas. When it is said that the cat is on the mat, the ideas of 
cat, existence, location, mat and particularity, just to name a few, 
are being combined together. For example, if the cat stood where the 
missing mat normally was to be found, then the statement, "The cat is 
on the mat," would not be totally false. The ideas of cat, existence, 
location and particularity would be for the most part correct. There-
fore, the statement would be partly true and partly false. It should 
be noted that one can hold to the belief that the world is coherent 
and not to the doctrine of degrees of truth, and, further, that the 
doctrine of degrees of truth involves a confusing of the concepts of 
. d d . 1 . 15 JU gment an lnc uslon. 
Coherence and the Longings of Contemporary Man 
Having briefly described the Coherence Theory, it is necessary 
to show its relationship to the contentions of this paper. The questions, 
14Ewing, pp. 208-209. 
15E . 441 Wlng, p. . 
"What is the relationship between the Coherence Theory and the Corre-
spondence Theory?" and, "What kind of acceptability qualifier is 
employed in the Coherence Theory?" must be asked and answered. 
Coherence and Correspondence. The two theories distinguished by the 
terms "coherence" and "correspondence" share the same view as to the 
nature of truth. They both believe that the essence of truth is caught 
in the Aristotelian dictum: "To say of what is that it is not, or of 
what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, 
or of what is not that it is not, is true."16 To the extent that each 
theory holds to this dictum, they assert that a true statement corre-
sponds to the facts of the world. To the extent that each theory holds 
to this dictum, they are correspondence theories. 
Coherence and the acceptability qualifier. For the Coherence Theorist, 
correspondence is not to be regarded as the test for truth. While 
defining truth as correspondence, the Coherence Theorist turns to a 
different criterion for testing truth. They generate an acceptability 
qualifier. They state that what makes a potential truth an acceptable 
one is the fact that it fits with their own thoughts. The criterion 
for truth, according to the Coherence Theory, is the coherence of 
statements to each other. For the Coherence Theorist, the question is 
not, "Does it fit reality?" but, "Does it fit your system of thoughts?" 
The question, "Does it fit your system of thoughts?" shows the 
egoism inherent in the Coherence Theory. Such a question exhibits the 
human tendency to be self-centered. It suggests the even more ego-
centric statement, "Of course it's true, it's just what I would have 
16T k' ars ~, p. 54. 
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said." In either case, truth becomes a function of an individual's 
(or possibly, a group's) theorizing. When coherence is employed as the 
acceptability qualifier, truth tends to become a subjective predicate 
about statements. Truth tends to be robbed of its objectivity. There-
fore, if truth is to be an objective predicate of statements, then 
either the acceptability qualifier must be scraped or redefined. 
THE PRAGMATIC THEORY OF TRUTH 
The Pragmatic Theory of truth is one of the few philosophical 
theories to have its birth in the United States of America. It had its 
beginning in the late 1800's in the thoughts of Charles Sanders Peirce. 
This theory was made popular by William James and refined by John 
Dewey. It will be this refined form of the theory that will be dis-
cussed in the following pages. 
John Dewey on Truth 
In Truth, Prof. White characterizes the Pragmatic Theory of 
truth as the belief that, "A true idea is one which fulfills its 
function, which works; a false idea is one which does not."17 The key 
word in understanding this characterization is the word "idea." So 
important is the proper conception of idea for the analysis of the 
Pragmat1c Tlieory of trutli tliat John Dewey wrote, after a thorough dis-
cussion of the proper conception of ideas: 
Little time is left to speak of the account of the nature 
of truth given by the experimental and functional type of 
logic. This is less to be regretted because this account 
is completely a corollary from the nature of thinking and 
ideas. If the view held as to the latter is understood, the 
conception of truth follows as a matter of course. If it be 
17
wh· 123 lte. p. . 
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not understood, any attempt to present the theory is 
bound to be confusingi and the theory itself to seem 
arbitrary and absurd. 8 
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Ideas. For John Dewey's concept of idea to be understood, ideas must be 
distinguished from facts and classified according to their purpose. 
It must be understood that facts and ideas are different types of 
things. Further, Dewey's notion of an idea cannot be separated from 
its function. Therefore, both of these issues will be discussed. 
For Mr. Dewey, ideas have an instrumental function: 
According to it [that is, Dewey's notion of idea] an 
idea--a term used loosely by these philosophers to cover 
any "opinion, belief, statement, or what not"--is an 
instrument with a particular function.l9 
But what is the function of an idea? John Dewey says of ideas that they 
function in the solution of problems: 
•.. ideas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories, 
systems are instrumental to an active reorganization of 
the given environment, to the removal of some specific 
trouble and perplexity, • 20 
Ideas function as hypotheses, proposals or plans for action in the 
solution of problems. One of the best places to look to find ideas 
functioning as hypotheses is in modern science. A look must be taken 
at modern science, and not Greek science, because, unlike Greek science 
which is centered in the classification of things, modern science is 
21 
18 John Dewey, "The Instrumentalist Account of Truth," Belief, 
Knowledge, and Truth: Readings in the Theory of Knowledge, ed. Robert R. 
Ammerman and Marcus G. Singer (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), 
p. 440. 
19
white, pp. 122-123. 
20 Dewey, p. 440. 
21
sheldon P. Peterfreund, An Introduction to American Philosophy 
(New York: The Odyssey Press, Inc., 1959), p. 211. 
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of problem solving. When in science, or life, an individual is faced 
with a problem, he reflects until the lights go on and he has an idea, 
a way out of the dilemma. Following this model, an idea functions as 
a suggested solution to the problem. Once it has been tested and found 
to work, the idea becomes transformed into a true idea, or judgment. 
Granted, ideas are not facts, but why must the two be distin-
guished? It is because facts confirm ideas. If facts and ideas were 
the same kinds of things, then the Pragmatic Theory would be reducible 
to the Coherence Theory of truth. It would be the same as saying that 
the truth of one statement is to be found in its coherence to other 
statements. Pragmatism, on the other hand, is interested not in 
coherence, but workability. 
Having stressed the need to distinguish these concepts, it 
becomes necessary to ask "How can facts be confused with ideas?" They 
can be confused with ideas because both facts and ideas are functional 
elements in investigations. "Facts are used in inquiry to set the terms 
of the problem by marking off what is secure and unquestioned."22 
Unlike an idea which speaks about possibilities, a fact points to what 
is. A fact can be likened to the clues with which a detective works to 
f . h. h h . h. .d 23 con lrm lS ypot esls, lS l ea. 
The criterion for truth. "Ideas become true when thelr 'draft upon 
existence' is honored by the verifying facts." 24 An idea has the poten-
tial of being true, because it promises that certain facts are going to 
22 Gertrude Ezorsky, "Pragmatic Theory of Truth," The Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy (1965), VI, 429b. 
23 Ezorsky, 429b. 
24 Ezorsky~ 429b-429c. 
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be found to be the case. For example, the idea that of the three keys 
on the ring it is the green key that will open the green door promises, 
that is, suggests, that, in fact, the green key will be found to be the 
one that opens the green door. When the green key opens the green door, 
then the idea is judged to be true. It is discovered that the idea 
worked. 
Pragmatism and the Longings of Contemporary Man 
The Pragmatic Theory of truth, like the Coherence Theory, has 
many ties to the theses of this paper. It has close ties to the 
Correspondence Theory of truth. It also defines the acceptability 
qualifier in a way which allows for a more objective character for truth. 
Pragmatism and correspondence. Pragmatists, like Coherence Theorists 
and Correspondence Theorists, contend that true statements do correspond 
to reality. Evidence of this point can be seen in these words by 
William James: "Truth ... is the agreement of an idea with reality." 25 
This agreement is not explicately defined as a semi-parallelism between 
beliefs and reality. This agreement is understood in terms of a process 
of wish fulfillment. A statement is made and then it is fulfilled by 
the facts of life. Despite, this difference in explicate definition, 
it is possible to combine the two positions. It can be said that the 
fulfilling fact can substantiate a promissory statement because its 
order is congruent with the closing words of the statement. For 
example, the fact that the cat is on the mat can verify the statement 
"John thinks that the cat is on the mat," because the order of the 
terms in the fact parallel the order of the terms in the "that-clause." 
25Wh't 1 e, p. 123. 
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Such a combination as the one just made, does two things. First, it 
justifies William James' claim that the Pragmatic Theory of truth is a 
form of the Correspondence Theory of truth. Second, it explains to 
some degree why a fact can verify an idea. It can verify an idea because 
it corresponds to it. 
Pragmatism and the acceptability qualifier. Not only does the above 
combination of the Correspondence Theory and the Pragmatic Theory justify 
James' assertion and explain why a fact can verify an idea, it estab-
lishes that the function fulfilling process is not the Pragmatists' 
definition of truth, but their criterion for truth. The concept of 
workability, like the concept of coherence, is freed to stand as the 
Pragmatists' candidate for the acceptability qualifier. 
The Pragmatists' suggestion for the acceptability qualifier is 
indeed to be preferred to that of the Coherence Theorists. It is to be 
preferred because it makes truth a more objective predicate. According 
to the Pragmatic Theory, truth is determined by objective facts, like, 
the presence of the cat on the mat, and not the statements of some 
individual's subjective system of thought. 
Despite this objectivity, the Pragmatic Theory has a fault. It 
is too tied to the process of problem-solving to deal with a priori 
truths as traditionally understood. An a priori truth is not a necessary 
truth, according to the Pragmatists, just a mere stipulation. Clarence 
Irving Lewis expressed this thought in the following way: 
The a priori represents an attitude in some sense 
freely taken, a stipulation of the mind itself, and a 
stipulation which might be made in some other way if it 
suited our bent or need. Such truth is necessary as 
opposed to contingent, not as opposed to voluntary. And 
the a priori is independent of experience not because it 
prescribes a form which the data of sense must fit, or 
anticipates some preestablished harmony of experience 
with the mind, but precisely because it prescribes 
nothing to experience. That is a priori which is true, 
no matter what. What it anticipates is not the given, 
but our attitude toward it: it concerns the uncompelled 
initiative of mind or, as Josiah Royce would say, our 
categorical ways of acting.26 
This is problematic because it makes various concepts, like the laws of 
mathematics or the notion of a figure-ground relationship, a purely 
arbitrary matter, and not a fact about the world. 
THE NON-DESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF TRUTH 
The Non-Descriptive Theory of truth was developed by P. F. 
31 
Strawson as an attempt to apply J. L. Austin's conception of performative 
27 
statements to the refutation of Tarski's Semantic Theory of truth, a 
28 
more precise form of the Correspondence Theory. J. L. Austin, 
however, did not approve of this application and attacked it in an 
article entitled "Truth." This article, as well as, one by P. F. 
Strawson, became the core of a symposium on truth prepared for the 
Aristotelian Society. The initial formulation of this doctrine by Mr. 
Strawson is to be found in an article entitled "Truth" which was pub-
lished in 1949, the year before the symposium, in Analysis. This article 
by Mr. Strawson will serve as the major source for the following exposi-
tion of his theory. 
Strawson, Performatives and Truth 
Fundamental to the Non-Descriptive Theory of truth is the belief 
26
clarence Irving Lewis, "A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori," 
Meaning and Knowledge: Systematic Readings in Epistemology, ed. Ernest 
Nagel and Richard B. Brandt (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1965), 
p. 221. 
27
see pages 9 and 10 of this paper. 
28
see page 21 of this chapter. 
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that truth is not a property. In fact, Hr. Strm..rson stated it in a 
more germane way in these words: "Truth is not a property of symbols; 
29 for it is not a property.'' To say that truth is not a property is to 
say that it is not about anything, especially statements or sentences. 
It is not the name of a quality possessed by a particular group of sen-
tences or statements. 
The assertion of this belief's contradiction, i.e., the assertion 
that truth is a property of sentences, results from maintaining one or 
both of the following two theses: 
First, any sentence beginning 'It is true that .. 
does not change its assertive meaning when the phrase 
'It is true that' is omitted. More generally, to say 
that an assertion is true is not to make any further 
assertion at all; it is to make the same assertion. 
This I shall call Thesis 1. 
Second, to say that a statement is true is to make 
a statement about a sentence of a given language, viz., 
the language in which the first statement was made. 
It is (in other and more technical terms) to make a 
statement in a meta-language ascribing the semantic 
property of truth (or the semantic predicate 'true') 
to a sentence in an object-language. The object-
sentence concerned should strictly be written in 
inverted commas to make it clear that we are talking 
about the sentence; and the phrase 'is true' should 
strictly be followed by some such phrase as 'in L', 
where 'L' designates the ob~ect-language concerned. 
This I shall call Thesis 2. 0 
What is being asserted in the first thesis is that the sentences, "The 
cat is on the mat," and, "It is true that the cat is on the mat," say 
no more than that the cat is on the mat. What is being asserted in the 
second thesis is more difficult to explain. Fundamental to understanding 
this thesis is an understanding of what is meant by the distinction 
29Peter Frederick Strawson, "Truth, 11 Meaning and Knowledge: 
Systematic Readings in Epistemology, ed. Ernest Nagel and Richard B. 
Brandt (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1965), p. 161. 
30 Strawson, pp. 160-161. 
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between an object-language and a meta-language. This distinction is 
difficult to grasp, because it is not like the distinction between 
Indo-European and Semitic languages. A language cannot at one time be 
an Indo-European language and at another a Semitic language. This is 
not the case with languages which can be classed as either object-
languages or meta-languages. It is possible, and often the case, that 
the same language can at one moment be an object-language and at the 
next a meta-language. How this is possible can be seen from the defi-
nition of the term "meta-language." A meta-language is by definition 
a language used to talk about other languages. For example, when some-
one says, "'Das ist mein Buch, 1 is a German sentence," he is saying 
something in English, his meta-language, about a sentence in his object-
language, German. 
After stating these theses, Mr. Strawson goes on to point out 
their good and bad points. 
Of these two theses, the first is true, but inadequate; 
the second is false, but important. The first thesis is 
right in what it asserts, and wrong in what it suggests. 
The second thesis is wrong in what it asserts, but right 
in what it implies. The first thesis is right in asserting 
that to say that a statement is true is not to make a 
further statement; but wrong in suggesting that to say 
that a statement is true is not to do something different 
from, or additional to, just making the statement. The 
second thesis is right in implying that to say that a 
statement is true is to do something different from just 
making the statement; but wrong in asserting that this 
'something different' consists in making a further state-
ment, viz., a statement about a sentence.31 
The fault with the first thesis is that it suggests that the phrase "is 
true" has no purpose. If this were the case, then there would be no 
reason to attach it to other sentences. If its being there does not 
alter the meaning of the sentence, then it must have some other purpose, 
31 Strawson, p. 161. 
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even if only to waste words. Even though, the distinction between 
object-languages and meta-languages is valuable, it is not in this 
situation that it proves its value. Mr. Strawson claims that the problem 
with the second thesis is that it ignores the context within which the 
phrase "is true" is used. It ignores the fact that the expression "is 
true" is not used to describe, but to agree. 
If the true elements of these two theses are combined, then the 
Non-Descriptive Theory of truth is born. According to Mr. Strawson, 
to say, "It is true that the cat is on the mat," is not to assert any-
thing about cats and mats, but to agree with an earlier speaker's 
assertion that there is a cat on the mat. "Is true" becomes synonymous 
with "I agree." Truth becomes the act of confirming. 
Strawson and the Longings of Contemporary Man 
Strawson's theory exhibits a greater degree of dissatisfaction 
with the Correspondence Theory of truth than any of the other theories 
covered. He is not interested in maintaining, or improving, any part 
of the Correspondence Theory. Despite this fact, his writings suggest 
some important things in regard to the directions of this paper. 
Strawson and correspondence. In other writings, Mr. Strawson points out 
that the big problem with the Correspondence Theory is that it never 
gets back to the world itself. If Tarski's theory of correspondence is 
followed, the move is from one sentence to another. If, on the other 
hand, Lord Russell is followed, the move is from a statement to a fact. 
The problem here is that a fact is already a word related picture of 
h ld . . 1' . lf 32 t e wor : lt lS not rea lty ltse . If this is the case, the world 
32 John R. Searle, "Strawson, Peter Frederick," The Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (1965), VIII, 27a-27b. 
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is never touched by the test of correspondence. This may be the very 
reason why people are striving to supplement the test of correspondence 
with an acceptability qualifier of some type. 
Strawson and the acceptability qualifier. In the Non-Descriptive Theory 
of truth, the ascription of the expression "is true" becomes simply a 
matter of fulfilling the conditions set by the acceptability qualifier, 
i.e., the rules of the linguistic game of agreement. The acceptability 
qualifier becomes a term for expressing contextual propriety. The ex-
pression "is true" can be attached to a statement if and only if it is 
involved in a verbal act of agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
It has been the purpose of this chapter to establish (1) that 
contemporary, Western man sees more in truth than a mere correspondence 
between what is and what is said; and (2) that he is trying, without 
complete success, to link to the belief that truth is the correspondence 
of statements to the world, an acceptability qualifier. The proof of 
the first point is to be found evidenced in the fact that while both 
the Coherence Theory and the Pragmatic Theory subscribe to the Aris-
totelian dictum of correspondence, i.e., "To say of what is that it is 
not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is 
that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true,"33 both suggest 
that more is involved with the labeling of some statement as true. The 
Coherence Theory and the Pragmatic Theory agree that this is a fine 
definition of what truth is but that it is not an adequate test for what 
is or is not true. The Coherence Theory suggests that the best test for 
33T k' 54 ars 1., p. . 
truth is the coherence of statements to each other. On the other hand, 
the Pragmatic Theory suggests that the best test of a statement's truth 
is to see whether or not it fulfills its function. In either case, 
more is involved in the definition and determination of truth than the 
assessment of correspondence. When the Non-Descriptive Theory is con-
sidered, it is found that the assessment of correspondence has nothing 
to do with the definition and determination of truth. In this theory, 
the meaning and use of the expression "is true" is totally determined 
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by the rules of the linguistic game called agreement. Both the weight 
of truth's definition and determination is thrown upon the Strawsonian 
conception of the acceptability qualifier. Therefore, in the three 
theories considered mere correspondence between what is and what is said 
is seen as being inadequate for both the determination and definition 
of truth. 
The inadequacy of the definitions put forward for the accept-
ability qualifier establishes the second thesis, i.e., that contem-
porary, Western man is trying, without complete success to link with 
the belief that truth is the correspondence of statements to the world, 
an acceptability qualifier. While each of the theories mentioned 
defines the acceptability qualifier, their definitions involve faults 
which detract from their acceptability. Either the definition is too 
subjective, too limited or too independent to be combined with corre-
spondence. For example, if the acceptability qualifier is understood 
in terms of coherence, it becomes too subjective. If it is considered 
from the Pragmatic point of view, it is found to be too limited for 
discussions of a priori truth. If the acceptability qualifier is con-
sidered from the perspective of the Non-Descriptive Theory, it is found 
that there is no need to rely upon the Correspondence Theory at all in 
the determination or definition of truth. Therefore, it can be said, 
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at least in terms of the theories considered, that there has been an 
effort to link with the Correspondence Theory an acceptability qualifier, 
but that the effort has not been a complete success. 
Chapter 3 
HEIDEGGER AND HIS SOURCES 
By this point, the writer believes he has established that at 
the heart of the Correspondence Theory of truth is the belief that 
reality or being, that is, what is, and truth are tied together. In 
order for a statement to be true in the primary sense of the term, it 
must correspond to a fact, i.e., to what is. It must be possible to 
match with the statement an event in the world. This is not as simple 
as it may seem. In fact, it has been suggested that it cannot be done. 
One person to have suggested this is P. F. Strawson. 1 
According to Mr. Strawson, the problem with the Correspondence 
Theory of truth is that it falsely equates facts with events in the 
world. The difficulty here is that facts and events are not the same 
thing. Unlike an event, a fact is a word related picture of the world: 
it is not reality itself. 2 A fact can be distinguished from an event, 
from reality itself, in that facts, "unlike events, situations, states 
of affairs, or objects, have no date or location."3 Hhere the cat may 
be on the mat now and gone in an hour, the fact that the cat was on the 
mat is timeless. Similarly, facts are not normally to be found reclining 
on mats. 
1 See pages 34 and 35 of this paper. 
2 John R. Searle, "Strawson, Peter Frederick," The E~cyclopedia 
of Philosophy (1965), VIII, 27a-27b. 
3 Alan R. White, Truth (Anchor Books ed.; Garden City: Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., 1970), p. 80. 
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This false equation of facts with reality is problematic, 
because the type of correspondence required by the Correspondence 
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Theory of truth is that of a statement's semi-parallelism with a fact. 4 
This being the case, truth is robbed of any direct connection to reality. 
The statement, "It is true that the cat is on the mat," is verified 
through comparing it with a fact, not reality. It may be asked, "Is 
every tie to reality then lost?" No. Reality is considered the 
criterion for determining whether or not something is a fact. There-
fore, truth does not have a direct, but a mediated tie to reality. 
According to the traditional formulation of the Correspondence Theory, 
facts bridge the gap between truths and events. 
This is not an altogether happy situation, because it evades the 
real issue. It leads people into falsely thinking that they understand 
what it is for a true statement to correspond to reality, when they do 
not. This approach to the problem explains what it is for a statement 
to correspond to a fact, but leaves untouched the problem of what it 
is for a fact to correspond to the world. The nature of the correspon-
dence between true statements and the world is not completely described. 
HEIDEGGER AND TRUTH 
It is from this unhappy situation that Martin Heidegger sought 
and found escape. This escape required a reformulating of the Corre-
spondence Theory of truth. His best presentation of this reformulated 
doctrine, which will now be called the Heideggerian Theory of truth, is 
to be found in "On the Essence of Truth." This reformulation is 
4
see pages 19 and 20 of this paper. 
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accomplished in two phases. The first phase involves the redetermi-
nation of what is the primary sense of truth. The second phase of this 
reformulation requires the elucidation of the early Greek conception of 
aletheia. 
A Switch in Primacy 
5 It was earlier stated that truth has two senses. Dr. Heidegger 
agrees with this point. Even though he agrees that truth has two 
senses, he disagrees with the earlier determination of which sense is 
primary. It was determined earlier that the primary sense of truth had 
to deal with statements, and not objects. Prof. Heidegger considers 
the reverse to be the case. 
Not only did Martin Heidegger switch the determination of 
primacy, he gave more descriptive names to the two classes of things 
which can be called true. To the first class of truths, that is, the 
things that are said, Prof. Heidegger gave the very appropriate name 
"propositional truths."6 He probably called them propositional truths, 
because their truth is dependent upon the propositions they express. 
The second class of truth he referred to as "material truths. ,.7 This 
is very appropriate terminology to use in regards to the objects that 
populate the world. 
Employing this new terminology, it is discovered that Heidegger 
would prefer to consider material truth as primary, and not secondary. 
5 See pages 8 and 9 of this paper. 
6Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth", trans. John Sallis, 
Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977), pp. 119 ff. 
7Heidegger, pp. 119 ff. 
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This stands in opposition to the earlier stance taken in this paper. At 
that point, the propositional sense of truth was considered primary. 
Dr. Martin Heidegger generates two reasons for making this change. 
The first of these deals with the scope of propositional truth. The 
second reason is rooted in the traditional definition of truth: "veritas 
est adequatio rei et intellectus [Truth is the adequation of matter and 
intellect.]."8 
It is not reasonable to assume that propositional truth is the 
primary sense of truth, because it presupposes material truth. If a 
statement is to be prepositionally true, it must first be materially true. 
A statement cannot be true, unless it is correctly stated: It cannot be 
prepositionally true, unless it meets the standards for being a proper 
statement. For example, "Four greens quickly," cannot be prepositionally 
true, because it does not meet the criteria for being a statement. The 
words, "Four greens quickly," cannot be prepositionally true, because it 
is not materially adequate. It is just an interesting collection of 
words, and not a statement. It says nothing. 
A second reason for making this switch is to be found in the 
traditional definition of truth. From the middle ages forward, truth has 
been generally defined as the adequation of matter and intellect. 
Accordingly, if one wants to check the truth of one of his ideas, he must 
compare it with the objects of his world. But, if this checking is to 
avo1d the falsehood brought by illusion, then it!Tlust be first determin..,eci!d~~~-­
whether or not the objects in question are materially true. To determine 
the truth of the statement, "There is a bent stick in the water," one 
must first determine if the stick is a real stick. Therefore, one must 
first determine the material truths involved before he can determine the 
status of the proposition in question. 
8Heidegger, p. 120. 
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Heidegger on Aletheia 
There are three things which have a great bearing upon Heidegger's 
understanding of aletheia. The first thing is the source from which he 
drew the concept. The second is the term, "letting be." The last item 
is his understanding of freedom. 
Heidegger, in formulating his understanding of aletheia, drew pri-
marily from three Greek philosophers. The first of these philosophers is 
Aristotle. Heidegger found a great deal of material concerning this sub-
ject in Aristotle's interpretation of aletheuein in the Nicomachean 
Ethics, "which analyzed the many ways of relating to 'truth,' that is, 
ways of letting beings show themselves as they are in their Being."9 The 
second Greek philosopher to serve as a source for Heidegger's musing 
about aletheia is Plato. The role that Plato's thought played in 
Heidegger's musings concerning truth can be found reflected in the article 
entitled, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth." Last, but by no means least, is 
Heraclitus. In fact, Heraclitus can be considered the most important of 
the three. Heraclitus can be considered the most important because it 
was fragment B 16 of Heraclitus' works which served as the text for 
Heidegger's article "Aletheia."10 
Even though aletheia is normally translated as truth, Heidegger 
found that the above mentioned Greeks used it in a little different way. 
For these Greeks, aletheia was not what corresponded, but what was 
disclosed. Therefore, Heidegger has chosen to translate aletheia as 
"disclosure" or "unconcealment."11 Aletheia, or truth, is predicated 
of something, when it serves to disclose what is. 
9
navid Farrell Krell, ed., Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings 
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977), p. 14. 
10 Krell, p. 396. 
llH "d 127 e~ egger, p. . 
One thing that allows this disclosing of the world to come 
about is described in the term "letting be." Heidegger uses this term 
in a sense quite different from the normal use. 
Ordinarily we speak of letting be whenever, for 
example, we forgo some enterprise that has been planned. 
"We let something be" means we do not touch it again, 
we have nothing more to do with it. To let something 
be has here the negative sense of letting it alone, of 
renouncing it, of indifference and even neglect.12 
If the world is to be disclosed, it must not be neglected. Anyone 
interested in disclosing the world must engage himself in the world. 
However, the phrase required now--to let beings 
be--does not refer to neglect and indifference but 
rather the opposite. To let be is to engage oneself 
with beings. On the other hand, to be sure, this is 
not to be understood only as the mere management, pre-
servation, tending, and planning of the beings in each 
case encountered or sought out. To let be--that is, to 
let beings be as the beings which they are--means to 
engage oneself with the open region and its openness, 
as it were, along with itself. Western thinking in its 
beginning conceived this open region as ta aletheia, the 
unconcealed. If we translate al~theia as "unconcealment" 
rather than "truth," this translation is notmerely more 
literal; it contains the directive to rethink the ordi-
nary concept of truth in the sense of the correctness of 
statements and to think it back to that still uncompre-
hended disclosedness and disclosure of beings. To 
engage oneself with the disclosedness of beings is not 
to lose oneself in them; rather, such engagement with-
draws in the face of beings in order that they might 
reveal themselves with respect to what and how they are 
and in order that presentative correspondence might take 
its standard from them.l3 
When one engages the world, for the sake of disclosing it, he must not 
engage it with a mind to alter it, to change it, but with a mind to 
leave it as it is. He must leave it as it is, so that it can conform 
to the material standards of truth applicable to it. "Letting be," 
then, is not an altering of being, but an assisting of being in its 
12 
'd 127 He1 egger, p. . 13Heidegger, pp. 127-128. 
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self-realization. It is the process of bringing being into being. 
Freedom is the last item of importance in considering the 
Heideggerian conception of aletheia. Freedom can be called a pre-
condition for aletheia. For Heidegger, freedom is not just the mere 
absence of chains and bars, it is engagement itself. Heidegger ex-
pressed it in this way: 
Freedom is not merely what common sense is content 
to let pass under this name: the caprice, turning up 
occasionally in our choosing, of inclining in this or 
that direction. Freedom is not mere absence of con-
straint with respect to what we can or cannot do. Nor 
is it on the other hand mere readiness for what is 
required and necessary (and so somehow a being). Prior 
to all this ("negative" and "positive" freedom), free-14 dom is engagement in the disclosure of beings as such. 
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The type of freedom which is of interest to Heidegger is not the freedom 
of mere engagement, but the kind of freedom which can be characterized 
as letting things be. Understood in this way, freedom is what brings 
truth into being. 
In summation, Heidegger understands aletheia, truth, to be the 
disclosure of the world that results from engaging the world in such a 
way that it can be what it is. 
The Heideggerian Theory of Truth 
Having discussed the Heideggerian switch and the Heideggerian 
conception of aletheia, it is possible to formu:hrt-e-----r:he Heideggerian 
Theory of truth. In brief, a statement is true when it allows something 
to be materially true. A statement is considered to be true when it 
serves as a cause for a being's revelation. The statement, "The cat 
is on the mat," is judged as true, when it serves to reveal an unknovm 
aspect of the eat's way of living, that is, when it reveals a mode of 
14H "d 128 e1 egger, p. . 
the eat's existence. 
It can be objected that this theory of truth robs true proposi-
tions of their timelessness. This is really not the case. What has 
been said above must be considered as a description of what happens 
when a statement becomes true. As the years pass, there is no reason 
to require that what has been revealed go back into hiding, even though 
this often happens. It is important to note that the importance of the 
revelation may decline as time passes. Facts have a habit, like most 
things, of becoming common place. For example, how many people are 
surprised when the lights go on? 
Heidegger and this Paper 
Heidegger's work in the area of truth is of importance to the 
development of this paper for two reasons. The first reason is that he 
presents us with a radical transformation of the Correspondence Theory. 
The second reason is that he suggests a new tack which can be taken in 
the definition of the acceptability qualifier. 
While still holding that truth is correspondence, Martin 
Heidegger brings about a radical transformation of the Correspondence 
Theory of truth. He brought about this transformation in doing two 
things. First, he established that contemporary man had erred in his 
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determination of which class of truths are really primary. He deter-
mined that material truths should be considered primary, and not propo-
sitional truths. The second thing he did was to reject the notion that 
correspondence consisted in a semi-parallelism of statements and facts. 
He rejected the notion that the correspondence lies between statements 
and the world. For Heidegger, statements are like ideas in the Pragmatic 
Theory of truth. Both statements and ideas are functional elements in 
the discovery of truth. Both are goal directed and validated terms. 
In both cases, the truth of a statement or idea depends upon its 
ability to bring about a desired end. In the case of ideas, the end is 
the solution of a problem. In the case of statements, the end is an 
understanding of what is. According to Heidegger the correspondence 
lies between objects and the standard for their existence. 
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The second reason that Heidegger is important to the development 
of this paper is that he offers a new direction which can be taken in 
the definition of the acceptability qualifier. What he suggests is 
that the real criteria for truth should be found in the standards for 
material truth. Unfortunately, he fails to define what these standards 
are. It is hoped that further examination in this area will yield the 
definition Heidegger missed. 
HEIDEGGER'S SOURCES 
In the previous section, the Heideggerian Theory of truth was 
discussed. It was discovered to be truly revolutionary, but yet incom-
plete. While suggesting a new direction which can be taken in the 
definition of the acceptability qualifier, it fails to follow through 
with a formulation of this definition. What this theory suggests is 
that the real criteria for truth is to be found in the standards for 
material truth. Unfortunately, the Heideggerian Theory fails to define 
what these standards are: It fails to define the acceptability qualifier. 
After noting this limitation of the Heideggerian Theory, the 
hope was expressed that further examination in this area would yield the 
definition that the Heideggerian Theory lacks. Where is this further 
examination to start? Probably, the best place for it to start is 
where Heidegger himself started. Consequently, the refining of this 
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theory will begin with an examination of the Greek philosophers from 
which Heidegger derived his theory. 
In his theorizing about truth, Heidegger drew primarily from the 
works of Aristotle, Plato and the Presocratics. The first two of these 
thinkers, that is, Aristotle and Plato, can be considered together. The 
Presocratics, on the other hand, must be considered separately from 
both Aristotle and Plato. 
Aristotle and his teacher, Plato, can be considered together, 
because they stand in opposition to the modes of Presocratic thought. 
Prior to Socrates, it was unity, and not difference, which characterized 
the thoughts of the Greek philosophers. When, for example, the Pre-
socratics thought about Being, they strove to maintain the identity, 
the sameness of such concepts, as Being and Becoming, reality and 
appearance. This is why people attribute to Thales, the "initiator of 
Greek philosophy"15 , the view that all things are one. 16 This situation 
was altered when Plato introduced the notion of ideal forms--unseen, 
quasi-spiritual entities--which he equated with Being. 17 As a result of 
this Platonic innovation, a gulf arose in philosophical thought between 
reality and appearance. Therefore, Plato is the point of demarcation 
for two philosophic traditions, i.e., the Presocratic and the Western 
metaphysical traditions. 
15Frederick Copleston, S. J., A History of Philosophy (Image 
Books Edition; Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962), Vol. I, 
Part I, p. 40. 
16 Copleston, Vol. I, Part I, p. 93. 
17J. L. Mehta, The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (New York: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), pp. 147-149. 
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Plato and Aristotle 
The emergence of this gulf between reality and appearance 
brought a change in the conception of truth for the entire Western meta-
physical tradition. Not only did it bring a change in the Platonic 
conception of truth, it also generated a new notion of truth which has 
been employed in the thinking of Western philosophers since the time of 
Plato. This means that Aristotle, though differing in many ways from 
Plato, employed generally the same notion of truth that Plato did. 
According to Heidegger, the emergence of this gulf transformed 
truth from being a matter of unhiddenness to a matter of perceptual 
18 
correctness, "from a-letheia to orthotes." To characterize truth as 
"orthotes", i.e., correctness, accomplishes something very interesting. 
It makes it possible to declare that the primary sense of truth is 
propositional. This is the case because truth becomes a matter of the 
correctness of a perceptually oriented proposition, and not a matter of 
some objects faithfulness to its essence. When truth is characterized 
as "orthotes", then it does not matter if it is characteristic of cats 
to bark. All that matters is whether or not some cat has been heard 
barking. If some cat has been heard barking, then it is true to say 
that the cat was barking. 
---------vvwll-Mt-1'la~t'-~'l'h'taMs'l-1bmeen said thus far about truth charaeterh:ecl-a-s--f'CT'IO"~"t"~"t~ecf"C~t-------
ness applies equally well to both Plato and the Western metaphysical 
tradition that he spawned. However, Plato's theory of truth did possess 
a feature which makes it unique. While opening the door to the idea 
that truth is primarily propositional in character, he did not move 
from the belief that truth is primarily material in character. He did 
18 Mehta, p. 149. 
not follow his thoughts to their ultimate conclusion. The reason that 
he did not follow his thoughts to their natural conclusion was that he 
was preoccupied with the analysis of absolute truth. 
In the Republic, especially those sections in which Plato pre-
sents the analogy of the Line and the allegory of the Cave, Plato 
declares that there are two kinds of truth, or knowledge. He calls one 
category opinion and the other, knowledge. It is only in the category 
called knowledge that Plato claims that real and infallible truth can 
be found. Most people would argue that there are truths to be found 
among man's opinions. Having mentioned that Plato believes that truth 
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is ultimately only to be found in the category labeled knowledge, it 
becomes necessary to delimit what he means to include in that category. 
Plato uses the term "knowledge" to refer to information about ideal 
forms, or what are now termed universals. On the other hand, Plato uses 
the term "opinion" to describe statements about appearances, about par-
ticulars. Statements about goodness would be categorized as knowledge 
bearing, because goodness is one of the Platonic ideal forms. The 
statement, "The cat is on the mat", would be a matter of opinion, because 
it deals with particulars. For Plato, true knowledge can only be 
possessed concerning the world of ideal forms. 
Before going in further, it must be understood that Heidegger 
rejected both the general notion of truth as correctness and Plato's 
particular formulation of that notion. Many reasons can be put forward 
for why Heidegger would want to reject this notion. The first reason 
is that it demands a distinction between reality and appearance. 
Heidegger makes abundantly clear in Being and Time that reality and 
appearance are one. In this work, he equates reality with essence and 
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then proceeds to establish a method for determining essential in a given 
series of some being's appearances. He argues that a being's essence 
is the common residue of that being's appearances. If, for example, a 
pyramid is described from a number of different vantage points and those 
descriptions are compared, what is found is that it is consistently 
described as a figure having at least two dimensions. This is found to 
be what Heidegger would call the essence, or reality, or being, of a 
pyramid. Therefore, because Heidegger views reality as a subset of all 
possible appearance, and not a separate category of existence, it would 
be impossible for him to support this Platonic based conception of truth 
as correctness. 
A second reason why Heidegger rejected this notion of truth can 
be found in the fact that it opens the door to the declaration that the 
primary sense of truth is propositional. Dr. Heidegger makes it clear 
in "On the Essence of Truth" that he believes the primary sense of 
truth to be material truth. 19 He put forward this position for two 
reasons. The first reason is that a statement cannot be true proposi-
20 tionally, unless it is a proper statement. For example, "Four greens 
quickly" cannot be prepositionally true, because it does not meet the 
criteria for being a statement. The words, "Four greens quickly", say 
nothing. The second reason was that the primacy of material truth is 
indicated by the traditional definition of truth: "veritas est adequatio 
[Truth is the adequation of matter and intellect]."21 According to this 
19Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth", trans. John Sallis, 
Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977), pp. 119 ff. 
20
see page 41 of this paper. 
21H .d 120 e1 egger, p. . 
definition, a statement's truth is based on its acceptable description 
of what is already materially true. This is a situation that is not 
always recognized by individuals subscribing to the traditional defini-
tion of truth. Therefore, considering Dr. Heidegger's rejection of the 
primacy of propositional truth for the above reasons, it would be un-
fair to expect him to support a theory that entailed the primacy of 
propositional truth. 
The last reason Prof. Heidegger would have for rejecting the 
notion of truth as correctness is that it is closely tied to the spirit 
of Nihilism. This conception of truth is the result of the generation 
of a gulf between reality and appearance. Heidegger claims that this 
step is the first move in mode of thought that finds its logical ful-
fillment in the Nihilism of Nietzsche. 22 By this claim Heidegger means 
to suggest that Plato began the trend for Western thinkers to reject 
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and rebel against their culture, instead of thinking through their 
culture. Nietzsche's exhortation to the effect that one should generate 
his own morals can be considered the flowering of this rebellious trend. 
It can be considered the flowering of Nihilism, because it tells the 
rebel what he can do once the traditional norms have been rejected. 
It tells the rebel that he can make up his own rules. On the other 
hand, the rather conservative Prof. Heidegger would prefer it, if a 
thinker would simply think through--discover what was intended in the 
thoughts of his ancestors. 
The Presocratics 
Desiring to turn from the rebelliousness of Plato and the 
Western metaphysical tradition, Prof. Heidegger turned to Plato's 
22 Mehta, pp. 126-127. 
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intellectual ancestors for direction. It was to Presocratic philosophy, 
especially the writings of Heraclitus, that he turned. 
The most important portion of Heraclitus' works for the formu-
lation of the Heideggerian Theory of truth is fragment B 16: "How 
could anyone escape the notice of that which never sets?"23 This 
fragment serves as the text upon which Heidegger based his article en-
titled "Aletheia."24 This statement is very elusive and seems to say 
little, if anything, about truth. The one thing that it seems to 
suggest is that what is true is obvious because it is always present 
with us. What is true is that which is not hidden. This statement, 
while encapsulating the Heideggerian Theory, does not throw any light 
on the standard for material truth. This fragment does not aid in the 
solution of the problem set for this chapter, that is, the determina-
tion of the criteria for material truth. Since, this is the only state-
ment in the works of Heraclitus dealing with truth, it can be stated 
that Heraclitus does not provide an answer to the question of what the 
standard for material truth is. This is also the case with the other 
Presocratics. 
The Greeks Reconsidered 
The hope that a turn to the Heideggerian sources would provide 
a detailing of the standard for material truth has proven fruitless. 
Neither the Platonic tradition nor the Presocratic thinkers have been 
of any help. In the investigation of Plato it was found that any 
23 John Mansley Robinson, An Introduction to Early Greek Philos-
ophy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968), p. 103. 
24David Farrell Krell, ed., Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings 
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977), p. 396. 
positive contribution that Plato could have made would have been at 
odds with Heideggerian metaphysics. It would have been at odds with 
Heidegger's metaphysics, because it divorced reality from appearance, 
"Being" from "Becoming." Even though, Heidegger and the Presocratics 
shared the belief in the identity of "Being" and "Becoming," the 
Presocratic writings were of no help in determining the standard for 
material truth. Therefore, if the hoped for solution to this problem 
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is to come, it can now be clearly seen that it must come from a different 
quarter. 
Chapter 4 
A PARALLEL TRADITION: THE BIBLE 
Despite the fact that the Heideggerian sources did not provide 
the hoped for standard for material truth, one need not give up the 
hope that it can be found. In fact, there is a parallel tradition that 
appears to provide the solution. This parallel tradition finds its 
literary expression in the Bible. This tradition can be called the 
Hebraic tradition or the Biblical tradition. 
THE GORDON THESIS 
One might object that the Biblical or Hebraic tradition does not 
parallel the Greek intellectual tradition. It could be objected that 
one is Semitic, and that the other is Indo-European. Or, it could be 
objected that one is prophetic, and that the other is philosophical. 
The Hebraic culture is clearly Semitic and prophetic in character, and 
not in the least Indo-European and philosophical. On the other hand, 
the intellectual development of the Greeks can be characterized as 
Indo-European and philosophical. Clearly a gulf exists between the 
Hebraic and the Greek traditions. 
Cyrus H. Gordon contends that, despite these differences, 
"Greek and Hebrew civilizations are parallel structures built upon the 
same East Nediterranean foundation."1 By this he means that both 
1 Cyrus H. Gordon, The Common Background of Greek and Hebrew 
Civilizations (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1965), p. 9. 
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civilizations were generated from the same foundation and that each 
built upon that foundation. Both the Greeks and the Hebrews took from 
the culture that spawned them. In doing this, they generated divergent, 
yet parallel, civilizations. 
This thesis was put forward by Prof. Gordon in an attempt to 
answer the question, "Why are there so many parallels between the Bible 
and Homer's poetry?" This question arose as a result of the discovery 
of significant parallels between the Bible and Homer. Among the many 
parallels which generated this question are the functional equivalence 
of the Greek aegis and the Hebrew Staff of God, 2 and the use of triads 
. 1 3 1n cata ogues. 
In addition to the various parallels, what evidence can be 
advanced in support of the contention that Greek and Hebrew civiliza-
tions are parallel structures. To these parallels Dr. Gordon adds two 
other types of evidence. First, Mr. Gordon supports his thesis through 
an analysis of East ~fediterranean urban society, i.e., through an 
analysis of the Levantine. Secondly, he strengthens his position by 
tracing the development of Minoan civilization. The Minoan civiliza-
tion was the foundation upon which the Greeks built their culture. 
When one understands the urban structure common in the eastern 
Mediterranean in and around the Amarna Age, he begins to see the poten-
tial for cross-cultural fertilization in this area. During this and 
earlier ages, the cities of the eastern Mediterranean were great 
commercial centers where people--merchants, soldiers and diplomats--
gathered from many lands. The cities were a sort of melting pot. This 
particular form or style of melting pot is termed a Levantine pattern. 
2 Gordon, pp. 12-13. 3 Gordon, pp. 16-17. 
The Levantine pattern is the mingling of distinct 
communities side by side. If we contrast a Levantine 
city (such as Istanbul, Beirut or Alexandria) with an 
American city (such as New York or Boston), the differ-
ence between the Near East Levant and the American 
melting pot will become clear. The minorities in the 
Levant maintain their individuality for centuries, and 
even millennia, whereas the norm in an American metrop-
olis is assimilation.4 
In a Levant, instead of forming one culture, the groups are allowed to 
intermingle and pollenate each other, while maintaining their own dis-
tinctives. In an environment like this it becomes very easy for an 
individual or a group to become familiar with another culture. This 
potentiality supports Dr. Gordon's thesis in that it establishes a 
method for cross-cultural fertilization that does not require the 
merging of the cultures involved. It allows the cultures to form in 
parallel structures as opposed to one tremendous monolithe. 
Dr. Gordon's analysis of Minoan history serves as the real 
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support of his thesis. His analysis of Minoan history is based primarily 
on two things. The first is his discovery that the earliest Minoan in-
5 
scriptions are written in a Semitic language. The second item upon 
which his history is based is the fact that the early Twelfth Dynasty 
6 Pharaohs overthrew the foreigners of the Delta. Dr. Gordon suggests 
that this conflict resulted in the mass exodus of Semites from the Nile 
Delta. It would be at this time that the Hebrews moved into the land of 
Canaan. Mr. Gordon suggests that Semites also moved during this period 
to the islands of Crete. In these islands the Semites set up what is 
now called the Minoan Culture. The fact that the Minoan culture is 
Semitic in origin is born out by the nature of the Minoan language. Dr. 
4 Gordon, pp. 30-31. 
5 Gordon, pp. 206-217. 6 Gordon, p. 7. 
Cyrus Gordon has established that the lingua franca of the Minoan 
civilization is Semitic. With the lingua franca of the Minoan culture 
being Semitic, it is only natural to assume that the major population 
group of this culture was Semitic and, quite possibly, from the Nile 
Delta. It might be objected that the islands of Crete are a little too 
far from Egypt for any major migration. In response to this objection, 
it can be stated that Prof. Fell of Harvard has discovered inscriptions 
which suggest that both Egyptians and Semites had colonized North 
7 America some 2500 years ago. The remainder of Minoan history has been 
known for a long time. During the close of the second millennia, Greek 
speaking Indo-Europeans invaded the islands of Crete. And, like the 
Romans who in turn invaded Greece, these Indo-Europeans adopted the 
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culture of the Minoans. It would then be as a result of this merging of 
the Greek and Minoan cultures that Homer would have become familiar 
with the Semitic world. 
Therefore, considering the data just presented, it is reasonable 
to say that both the Greek and the Hebrew cultures are parallel struc-
tures built upon the same foundation. It now seems clear that both the 
Greek and the Hebraic traditions were spawned in Egypt and that both 
cultures followed divergent, yet parallel, courses of development. With 
this being the case, the Hebraic tradition would then be an excellent 
place to turn to find a theory of truth similar to the early Greek 
theory, and to, also, find a determination of the standard for material 
truth. 
7Barry Fell, America B. C. (New York: Quadrangle/The New York 
Times Book Co., 1976). 
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THE BIBLE, THE GREEKS AND TRUTH 
The Bible is the chief expression of the Hebraic tradition and, 
as such, the best place to look for material on the Hebraic notion of 
truth. One might object that the Bible is not the best place to turn, 
because it represents two different traditions, i.e., the Jewish and the 
Christian. It is true that the Bible contains material sacred to both 
of these faiths, but it is wrong to suggest that they are completely 
distinct traditions. The Christian faith is no more than the fulfillment 
of the first stages of the Hebraic tradition. This fulfillment is the 
result of the arrival of the promised Messiah, Jesus Christ. Christ 
revolutionized--but did not abandon--the Hebraic tradition by doing two 
things. First, he pushed through to the essence of the tradition in his 
teachings. Secondly, he brought reconciliation with God, the goal of 
the Hebraic tradition, through his death and resurrection. 
Even though truth is conceived in essentially the same \vay 
through out the Bible, there are some differences between the presenta-
tions of the Old Testament and the New Testament. The New Testament 
expresses a much fuller understanding of truth. In the Old Testament, 
as well as the New Testament, truth is discussed in a number of different 
connections. The Old Testament conception of truth finds its expression 
in the usage of the Hebrew word 11 >emeth. 11 11 ,)emeth 11 is used in primarily 
three different ways in the Old Testament. It is considered from the 
perspectives of epistemology, law and religion. 8 11Aletheia 11 is the 
8 f d 1 d lf 1 11 ~ I I Gott ried Quell, Gerhar Kitte an Rudo Bu tmann, ~eec~, 
J \ " / .! ~ I ) / II h Th 1 . 1 D . . f h N a..r.1'f.,.,s , fN\ !lflt vos , o. A"!/Be.vc1;, _T_e __ e_o_o_,g"'-l_c_a _ l_c_t_l_o_n_a_r.:...y_o __ t_e __ e_w 
Testament (1964), I, 232-237. 
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Greek term used to signify the New Testament conception of truth. 
Rudolf Bultmann points out in the Theological Dictionary of the New 
Testament that "aletheia" is used in six different ways. He suggests 
that it is used for that which has the force of certainty; for that upon 
which a person can rely; for that which is disclosed in experience; for 
that which is a true statement; for that which is a true doctrine; or 
f h h . h . . 9 or t at w lC lS genu1ne. 
From the perspective of epistemology, the Old Testament teaches 
that the word ")emeth" describes a firm, binding reality. 10 It describes 
a world with which one interacts. It suggests, as did Heidegger and the 
Presocratics, that a precondition for truth is engagement with the 
world. It also indicates that truth is ultimately grounded in reality. 
Here is found the suggestion that truth involves both the individual's 
encounter with the world and the primacy of material truth. 
It is in the New Testament that the last parallel is found 
which allows for the identification in essential respects between the 
Hebraic and the Heideggerian/Presocratic conceptions of truth. This 
last parallel is tied to one of the six points mentioned above in Bult-
mann's description of aletheia's use in the New Testament. Within the 
Bible, the Heideggerian corpus and the Presocratic literature, the term 
aletheia denotes non-concealment, disclosure. All these sources indi-
cate that material truth is rooted in the disclosure of the world that 
results from engaging the world in such a way that it can be what it is. 
With material truth defined in this way, it is then possible to say with 
9 Quell, Kittel and Bultmann, 242-247. 
10 Quell, Kittel and Bultmann, 232-233. 
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Heidegger that a statement is prepositionally true when it allows 
something to be materially true. The statement, "The cat is on the 
mat," is determined to be true, when it serves to disclose some unknown 
aspect of the eat's way of living, that is, when it unveils a mode of 
the eat's existence. 
Bultmann relies heavily on the first chapter of Romans to 
support his thesis that aletheia is sometimes employed in the Bible to 
denote non-concealment, disclosure. He considers the key verses for his 
argument to be verses 18, 19 and 25. He understands these verses to be 
speaking of God as a "revealed reality."11 He finds additional support 
in Acts 4:27, Colossians 1:6 and numerous places in John. 12 
The parallel between the New Testament and the Heideggerian con-
ceptions of truth extends beyond the level of material truth. The New 
Testament also views propositional truth in a functional way. Paul's 
defense of his gospel in I Corinthians suggests a functional view of 
language. The passage states that Paul wants to be judged in terms of 
the success of his proclamation. A functional view of language and 
h . f . 1 . f . . 1 h 13 preac 1ng suggests a unctlona v1ew o propos1t1ona trut . 
Having made these identifications, it is now proper to ask if 
the Bible can answer the question Heidegger and the Presocratics could 
not. It is time to see if the Bible suggests a standard for material 
truth. It is now time to see if the Bible suggests a method for deter-
mining whether or not a given disclosure presents some facet of the 
11 Quell, Kittel and Bultmann, 243. 
12 Quell, Kittel and Bultmann, 243. 
13That Paul did indeed view propositional truth from a func-
tional perspective will be established in the later treatment of I 
Thessalonians 2. 
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world as it is. 
At this point in the investigation, the writer was most fortu-
nate to come across I Thessalonians 2. This passage was important for 
what it suggested, and not what it actually said. While these verses 
did not define the acceptability qualifier, they did suggest a course of 
study which led to its definition. 
I Thessalonians 2 is a defense of Paul's ministry. The Pauline 
defense parallels the Heideggerian Theory of truth and suggests a new 
direction for the investigation. The Revised Standard Version of the 
Bible renders this passage in the following words: 
For you yourselves know, brethern, that our visit to 
you was not in vain; 2 but though we had already suffered 
and been shamefully treated at Philippi, as you know, we 
had courage in our God to declare to you the gospel of 
God in the face of great opposition. 3 For our appeal 
does not spring from error or uncleanness, nor is it made 
with guile; 4 but just as we have been approved by God 
to be entrusted with the gospel, so we speak, not to 
please men, but to please God who tests our hearts. 
5 For we never used either words of flattery, as you 
know, or a cloak for greed, as God is witness; 6 nor did 
we seek glory from men, whether from you or from others, 
though we might have made demands as apostles of Christ. 
7 But we were gentle among you, like a nurse taking care 
of her children. 8 So, being affectionately desirous of 
you, we were ready to share with you not only the gospel 
of God but also our own selves, because you had become 
very dear to us.l4 
This passage's most important portion is verse three: "For our 
appeal does not spring from error or uncleanne-ss-;-nor is it made with 
guile."15 From the context, it is clear that, in this verse, Paul is 
asserting the veracity, the truth, of his teachings. In making this 
assertion Paul combines three concepts. These concepts are error, 
14r Thessalonians 2:1-8 (RSV). 
15I Thessalonians 2:3 (RSV). 
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uncleanness and guile. The last of these concepts "guile" can be 
omitted from our discussion, because it is clearly a reference to moral, 
and not epistemological truth. The other two terms have a more epis-
temological character and will, therefore, be studied. 
Breaking with the understanding represented in the King James 
Version of the Bible, the Revised Standard Version rendered the Greek 
word "planes" by the English word "error." In the King James Version, 
it is translated by the word "deceit." The Revised Standard Version's 
translation is to be preferred, because the term "deceit" does not 
accurately represent what is expressed in the Greek word "planes." This 
word refers to what misleads or causes one to wander from what is at 
hand. It is understood by analogy with the straying of sheep. Under-
stood in this way, planes reflects not only the moral truth suggested by 
deceit, but also epistemological truth. Therefore, the more neutral 
term "error" is to be preferred. 
When planes is understood in its more primordial sense, as that 
which misleads or causes one to wander astray, it can be said to allude 
to the nature of propositional truth. It appears to be an employment of 
the notion of propositional truth conceived of as an instrument for 
bringing about the disclosure of some item. Paul seems to be saying 
that his statements have not been turning people away from experiencing 
------
Christ as he truly is, but have been pointing to him. In fact, Paul 
elsewhere claims to be directing people to Christ and to him crucified. 16 
In this passage, Paul appears to be using the same conception of truth 
attributed to Heidegger and found elsewhere in the Bible. 
The use of uncleanness in the analysis of epistemological truth 
16I Corinthians 2:2. 
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seems incongruent. Discussions of cleanness seem more appropriate in 
the field of moral science; however, it also has a place in epistemology. 
The biblical term "clean" and its opposite "unclean" can operate in both 
spheres of thought, because they are used to denote various states of 
acceptability which are determined by the same basic criteria in both the 
fields of ethics and epistemology. The point that the term "clean" is 
used to denote a state of acceptability should be fairly obvious. When 
something is clean, it is acceptable. For example, when a Jew declares 
a ham steak to be unclean, he does not mean that it has dirt on it but 
that it is not an acceptable food stuff. The second point, i.e., that 
ethics and epistemology both employ the same basic criteria for accept-
ability, is not as easy to see and will require an exposition of the 
biblical conception of cleanness. 
Before pressing further, the exact relationship between the 
term "clean" and its standard--which will later be employed as the 
acceptability qualifier in virtually all areas of truth--must be ex-
plained. "Clean" is a label for what has been determined to be accept-
able. Its standard is the test for acceptability. If something meets 
the standard, then it is labeled clean or acceptable. This is similar 
to the act of labeling a piece of meat prime. When the meat passes 
inspection, that is, meets the criteria, then it is graded prime. The 
label "clean" and its standard are related as elements in a testing or 
grading process. 
What test does the Bible suggest for cleanness? If one concen-
trates on the Old Testament, the Law stands out as the standard. If, 
for example, one wants to know about a given meat's acceptability, all 
he needs to do is see what is said in the Law. After reading Leviticus 
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11:5, the individual would know that a piece of coney is unclean. In 
the Old Testament, the Law appears to be the final standard for clean-
ness. 
The use of the Law as the standard for cleanness, may be fine in 
the area of morality, but not in the area of epistemology. It is espe-
cially useless in the determination of material truth. Where, for 
example, the Law informs one about the moral status of the coney, it 
gives very little information about the material status of the coney. 
On the basis of the Law one cannot distinguish between a hare and a 
coney. They are both described as not being clovenfooted, cud chewers. 
Some German scholars suggest that another standard for cleanness 
in the Old Testament is an item's proximity to something of great super-
17 
natural power. If something has recently been close or is now close 
to a fearful power, then it is considered unclean. These scholars 
suggest that it is this conception of uncleanness that led to both the 
early Greek and Hebrew declarations that sex was unclean. Sex was 
labeled unclean, because fearful powers were viewed as taking part in 
sexual activity. 
This notion of cleanness is also of little help in this investi-
gation. It makes any assessment of cleanness, of acceptability, a very 
transitory judgment. At one moment, it is; and, at the next moment, it 
is not. When one seeks for truth, especially epistemological truth, 
one wants something that is lasting. With this being the case, it is 
only natural to assume that the same individual would want to work with 
and F. 
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a fairly permanent standard for acceptability. Therefore, if a stan-
dard for cleanness, like the one above, is going to be highly transitory, 
then it will not be suitable for the determination of epistemological 
truth. 
When the essence of the Hebraic tradition is revealed in the 
New Testament, the actual standard for cleanness is found to be quite 
different from what it appeared to be in the Old Testament. The New 
Testament declares that cleanness is determined by an act of God. It 
is taught that it is not someone's or something's adherence to the Law 
that counts, but what God has done to him or it. It is not proximity 
to a fearful power that determines someone's or something's cleanness, 
but an act of God. 
A very enlightening passage in the New Testament on the rela-
tionship between cleanness and the acts of God is to be found in the 
lOth chapter of Acts. In verses 9-16 of this chapter is recorded a 
vision Peter had. In this vision a sheet was lowered from heaven con-
taining various of unclean animals. After the lowering of the sheet, 
the following conversation transpired. 
13 And there came a voice to him, "Rise, Peter; kill 
and eat." 14 But Peter said, "No, Lord; for I have 
never eaten anything that is common or unclean." 15 And 
the voice came to him again a second time, "What God has 
cleansed, you must not call common."l8 
Because of this vision's importance and Peter's slowness, God repeated 
this scene two more times. 
This vision was given to teach the very important point that 
cleanness is a result of God's actions. Upon what kind of action per-
formed by God is cleanness dependent? Verse 15 suggests that it is the 
18 Acts 10:13-15 (RSV). 
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result of God cleansing something. To say this does not push the in-
vestigation forward. Of course, when something has been cleansed, it 
is clean. To say this is to express an utterly trivial tautology. If 
this investigation is to progress any further, then God's act of 
cleansing must be described in a non-tautological fashion. 
Just such a description is to be found in the conception of a 
new creation. It may be objected that cleanness and creation are com-
pletely unrelated concepts, but this is not the case. It is in Galatians 
6:15 that Paul establishes the connection between these concepts. In 
this verse Paul contrasts the notion of cleanness as resulting from an 
act of God with the apparent Old Testament notion that cleanness is tied 
either to someone's or something's adherence to the Law or to its 
proximity to some fearful force. In this passage he represents the 
apparent Old Testament view by the terms "circumcision" and "uncircum-
cision." He represents the view that cleanness results from God's 
action with the New Testament conception of a new creation. Asserting 
the superiority of the New Testament view, Paul says, "For neither cir-
. . f h. . . . b . 1119 cumc1s1on counts or anyt 1ng, nor unclrcumc1s1on, ut a new creat1on. 
How does the New Testament conceive of the new creation? The 
New Testament describes a new creature as being the result of God's 
transforming intervention in an individual's life. God changes the 
believing sinner into a new creature, a saint. God creates a new being 
freed from its past sins. Used in this way the term "new creature" is 
a label synonymous in many respects with the term "clean." For this 
paper, what is important is not the label, but the process leading to 
that label. The labeling of someone as a new creature results from a 
19Galations 6:15 (RSV). 
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creative act of God. As with cleanness, the New Testament conceives 
of the new creation as a label resulting from an act of God, to be exact 
from a creative act of God. 
If these ideas are extended beyond the limits of the new creation, 
then something very wonderful is discovered. It is found that the Bible 
conceives of God's creative activity as being the ground for both its 
notion of ethical acceptability and its notion of epistemological accept-
ability. The Bible suggests in various ways that, in his creative work, 
God has established the standard by which things are to be judged. This 
is a truth found in the Old Testament, as well as, the New Testament. 
For example, the Law that the Jews were so prone to use as a standard 
for moral truth gained its authority from the fact that God had created 
it. 
In establishing the Law, God revealed some of the standards that 
he had placed in the universe. Unfortunately, he did not reveal them 
all, when he gave the Law. While the Law was very complete in the area 
of morality and religious practice, it did not provide a standard for 
the determination of material truth which is the object of this portion 
of the current investigation. Even though, the Law did not give all the 
desired information, it did establish the fact that there are standards 
in the universe. 
Fortunately, God in his creative activity has provided a mech-
anism for making determinations in the area of material truth. God has 
established a way to determine whether or not various things are genuine. 
He has made provision for a test to determine if, for example, some 
creature is truly a coney. He did this by establishing the principle 
that things reproduce according to their own kind. Conies bear other 
conies, while roses produce other roses. 
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With the universe reproducing according to the principle of 
kind, man can determine an item's authenticity through a process of com-
parison. An individual can take a random sampling of items already rec-
ognized as being members of a given group, compare them, preparing a 
a listing of the characteristics they have in common, and, then, check 
the item in question against the list to determine if it is the real 
thing. If the item has everything on the list, then the individual knows 
that the item is authentic. For example, a random sampling of conies can 
be taken and compared. The list of their shared characteristics, like 
no visible tail, short ears, etc., could then serve as the standard or 
test for genuine conies. This listing would be serving as the standard 
for material truth with respect to conies. It would be the acceptability 
qualifier for coneyhood. 
Because of the terminological awkwardness of the preceeding para-
graph, some new terminology will be introduced. In the previous para-
graph, three terms had the tendancy to get into each other's way. These 
terms are "group", "characteristics" and "list." This situation can be 
altered by employing terminology common to the mathematical sciences. 
In mathematics groups are referred to as sets. The characteristics men-
tioned are called set-defining characteristics. A list of set-defining 
characteristics for the same set is termed the definition of that set. 
With this new terminology in hand, it can be seen that the standard for 
material truth--the long hoped for acceptability qualifier--amounts to 
no more than the definition of the set for the category in which the ob-
ject in question seeks membership. 
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SU}fl1ARY 
In this section of chapter 4, three things have been accomplished. 
First, Cyrus H. Gordon's thesis that the Greek and Hebrew traditions are 
parallel structures springing from the same foundation has been re-
viewed and supported. This has permitted this investigation to journey 
beyond the fruitless fields of Greek thought into the pages of the Bible. 
Upon turning to the Bible, it was discovered that the Bible conceived 
of epistemological truth in essentially the same way that Heidegger and 
the Presocratics did. This fact provided impetus to continue the search 
for the standard for material truth, for the acceptability qualifier, 
within the pages of the Bible. Lastly, the long hoped for standard for 
material truth was discovered to rest in the definition of various sets 
of objects. 
Chapter 5 
CONCLUSION 
The point has finally been reached towards which the previous 
chapters have been directed. It is now possible both to present in 
final form and to evaluate the conception of truth aimed at in this in-
vestigation. This point has been reached through the process of estab-
lishing three things. The first thing that needed to be established was 
that various attempts on the part of contemporary, Western man to link 
with the belief that truth is the correspondence of statements with the 
world an acceptability qualifier, a standard for truth, have failed. 
Secondly, a new direction had to be established for the investigation. 
This new direction was found in the writings of Martin Heidegger. In 
his attack of the various analytical theories of truth, he determined 
that the primary form of truth was material, and not propositional. 
This switch in the attribution of primacy brought about revolution in 
theorizing about truth. It changed the nature of the correspondence 
between statements and the world from a material correspondence to a 
functional correspondence. It also shifted the search for the accept-
ability qualifier from the realm of propositional truth to the area of 
material truth. Lastly, a definition for the acceptability qualifier 
had to be established. This definition was arrived through an investi-
gation of the biblical conception of cleanness. The acceptability 
qualifier was determined to be the list of set-defining characteristics 
for the category in which the object in question seeks membership. With 
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all this established, this paper's definition of truth can be presented 
and evaluated. 
A DEFINITION OF TRUTH 
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The goal of this paper has been the production of a definition 
of propositional truth. Such a definition must come in two parts. The 
first part is foundational in character. The foundation for the defini-
tion of propositional truth is to be laid by the defining of material 
truth. Upon this foundation will be laid the definition of propositional 
truth. 
The assessment that something is truly what it appears or claims 
to be involves three things. It involves first the assessors engagement 
with the object in question in such a way that it can be itself. 
Secondly, it involves the assessor's determination through a process of 
comparison what the characteristics are that determine membership in the 
desired category. Lastly, it involves the comparison of the listing of 
set-defining characteristics with the object in question. Bearing this 
in mind, material truth can be defined as the correspondence of an item 
with the standard for the category to which it belongs that has been 
discovered through an assessor's open experience of the world. 
It is to this foundation that this paper's definition of propo-
sitional truth is to be added. Propositional truth, following Heidegger, 
is understood as referring to that state in which a statement serves to 
bring about an awareness of some material truth. The statement, "This 
is a coney," is determined to be true, when it serves to reveal the fact 
that it is materially true that the object referred to is a coney. In 
this view, a statement is true when it fulfills the function of revealing 
72 
something about the world. 
This is a functional, as opposed to static, account of proposi-
tional truth. In this sense, it is similar to the Pragmatic Theory of 
truth, but in contrast to the Correspondence Theory of truth. In the 
Pragmatic Theory, a statement's truth is a product of its success in 
problem solving, where here it is a product of its revelatory effective-
ness. This is to be contrasted with the Correspondence Theory which 
views truth as a static matching relationship. 
EVALUATION 
The evaluation of this theory will be considered under two 
headings. Its problems and its impact will be considered. 
The Theory's Problems 
For all the objections that this theory has laid to rest, it 
still has two major problems. Both problems are tied to the operation 
of the acceptability qualifier. In the first place, it can be objected 
that there are groups which are homogeneous and do not have any one 
characteristic in common. Secondly, it can be objected that the accept-
ability qualifier, the standard for material truth, cannot adequately 
deal with unique items. 
The notion of a set-defining characteristic cannot be univer-
sally used in the formulation of the standard for material truth, because 
there are sets which do not have set-defining characteristics. The best 
example of this type of set is the extended family. lVhen one considers 
the list of possible set-defining characteristics for any one extended 
family, he finds that they do not even share the same family name. This 
is a problem that this paper's theory as currently formulated cannot 
avoid. If, however, this theory were supplemented with Wittgenstein's 
notion of family resemblances--the doctrine that a group can be bound 
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together by characteristics which, though they are not universal through-
out the group, do overlap at various points in the group--the problem 
d . 1 1sappears. 
The second problem is the application of the acceptability 
qualifier to unique items. If, for example, there is one and only one 
coney, how does one determine that it really is what it is. The problem 
amounts to the denial that a set of one item has set-defining character-
istics. This problem does not result from the fact that sets of one 
item do not have characteristics, but from the fact that they are very 
hard to determine and tend to be quite arbitrary in nature. The best 
method for such a determination is to consider sets of one individual to 
be sets of experiences of that individual and, then, compare the ex-
periences in the same way that various individuals would be compared. 
This is really the best method, because what the assessor is interested 
in really determining is not whether the individual is the individual, 
but whether or not a given experience of the individual is an experience 
of that individual. 
The Impact of the Theory 
With these objections answered, the impact of this theory can now 
be considered. Only two of the possible areas of impact will be con-
sidered. The first area the central issue of 
philosophy of language, i.e., the nature of linguistic meaning. The 
second area is a theological issue, i.e., the doctrine of propositional 
inerrancy. 
1Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. 
M. Anscombe (3rd ed.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953), pp. 31-32. 
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When one views propositional truth in a functional way, he is 
almost required to conceive of the meaning of language functionally, too. 
This would require the rejection of nominalism. This is not a logical 
but a psychological demand. It is logically possible that a statement 
can function effectively as a source of revelation, because its words 
name items in the world. Even though, it is possible, it is not necessary. 
It is psychologically demanding, because Western man has long believed 
that meaning and truth are congruent structures. This demand is not 
especially problematic, because there now exist highly refined functional 
conceptions of language. 
This theory does present a problem for people who believe that 
the Bible is God's inerrant word. It does not provide a method for 
determining the truth of the Genesis account of creation. In fact for 
that matter, it does not provide a method for validating the theory of 
evolution either. This theory does not provide a method for handling 
events that have happened once and only once. Even the suggestion that 
was put forward for handling sets of one individual would not work in 
this situation, because there is no way to divide a single experience 
into more than one experience. Perhaps, this should not be considered 
a problem for the supporter of inerrancy, but for the supporter of this 
theory. It is a problem for the supporter of this theory, because it 
implies that this theory is not developed enough to handle matters of 
history. This should not come as a great shock, because this is only a 
provisional theory in an investigation that is "unterwegs." 
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